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Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and Mari Lee Mifsud 
WEDGE AND BRIDGE: A NOTE ON RHETORIC AS DISTINCTION 
AND AS IDENTIFICATION 
Henry Johnstone (1970 p. 124, 1990) has advanced the slogan "Rhetoric is a 
wedge" to suggest the ways in which rhetoric calls attention to hitherto 
unnoticed consequences or assumptions, or even to features of the physical world 
that have escaped an audience's attention. Here, however, we intend to supple- 
ment the notion of rhetoric as "wedge" by suggesting the ways in which it is, and 
also must be, a "bridge."' 
Technically, we could say that the two functions of rhetoric here under consid- 
eration are distinction and identification. We distinguish ideas that we may have 
tended to confuse, and distinguish from the background the stimuli we should be 
attending to. We identify diverse elements of the social landscape, including 
ourselves, with a cause or project requiring, or at least inviting, solidarity. Some 
examples shortly. But first it is important to declare that we authors make no 
attempt to define "rhetoric." We only appeal to an intuition of what it is that can 
be the instrument of either distinction or identification. It would not be strange if 
persuasion had something to do with it. 
Let us return to the rhetoric of identification. Since this was not discussed in 
(1990), we ought to try to say enough about it now. But we mean to provide 
only the barest sketch. It is by no means a full study we are attempting here. 
Among the performances of the rhetoric of identification, the most pervasive 
is clearly that which is susceptible to being dismissed as "mere rhetoric." Speech 
of this kind ranges from political utterances perceived as radically biased through 
pep rallies and other partisan gatherings that might be aptly characterized as 
"bacchanalian." Through its revelry and indulgence, this rhetoric fixes both the 
speaker and audience on the particular worth of an action, idea, event, person, 
etc. in such a way that the possibility of alternative perspectives is never brought 
to consciousness. Mere rhetoric is therefore not a wedge. But it is not quite a 
bridge either. The judgment required to discern and associate ideals of virtue is 
bypassed in mere rhetoric. That which moves the psyche along is more akin to 
compulsion than judgment. Furthermore, such rhetoric bypasses different per- 
spectives, rather than overcomes them. "To overcome" suggests direct experi- 
ence with opposition, while "to bypass" connotes indirection, or avoidance of 
opposition, through such tactics as silence or raising misdirected issues against 
opposition, what some might call trickery. 
Another performance of identification is the rhetoric classed as "epideictic." 
While epideictic has certainly been held in suspicion because of its tendency 
(throughout history) to display oratorical excellence, rather than public excel- 
lence, we are not forced to be suspicious. We can for instance envision a less 
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suspect function of epideictic which would entail seeing the ways in which cul- 
tural excellence comes to be identified. Gerard Hauser (1998) has most recently 
put voice to such a vision by exploring epideictic as didactic, as a teacher of 
public excellence through the display of public models of virtue. Didactic 
epideictic provides a common ground of public virtue from which deliberative 
and forensic argumentation can proceed. 
To say that epideictic is didactic suggests it is both a wedge and a bridge. As a 
wedge, epideictic opens audiences to the ideal of virtuous behavior. As a bridge 
it connects an audience's consciousness of virtuosity with a model of public 
virtue. It bridges the self with the virtuous other. 
We can look to the common rhetorical techniques (koina), in addition to rhe- 
torical genres, for another operation of identification. Take for example, the rhe- 
torical technique which Aristotle calls amplification (auxesis), which he describes 
as generally applicable to all three types of speech but particularly well suited 
for epideictic (1 368a).3 Amplification takes as its subject the undisputed. It draws 
from a common pool of readily available and agreed upon beliefs, values, and 
understandings. As Aristotle describes, when a particular consciousness is in an 
audience already, all that remains to be done by the rhetor is to attribute to it 
greater beauty and importance, in other words to celebrate this consciousness 
(1368a). While this celebration is not a wedge, since it calls attention to nothing 
the audience did not already believe, it is a bridge. It is an appeal to the identifi- 
cation of "like" consciousness. Only when this identification descends into an 
ecstasy beyond reason does it degenerate from bridge to bypass, from rhetoric to 
mere rhetoric. 
If amplification operates as a general technique within all three genres of rheto- 
ric, and if it is a way of bridging, then the bridge as a metaphor for identification 
is applicable to all three genres, not just epideictic but deliberative and forensic 
address. Rhetoric works as a wedge in deliberative and forensic speech prima- 
rily to open an audience's awareness to the existence of a particular problem that 
needs attending. But the evocation of this awareness is only the beginning of 
what might be described as a tripartite rhetorical transaction. Beginning with a 
problem, deliberative and forensic rhetoric proceeds through deliberation to a 
decision. It is the third term which requires "rhetoric as a wedge" to be supple- 
mented with "rhetoric as a bridge." The wedge alone cannot bring the rhetorical 
process to its necessary end of judgment. 
This is the case whether we are speaking of the more traditional Aristotelian 
referent of public address, or whether we are speaking of a performance of identi- 
fication beyond this, such as the reflexive rhetoric which both of us have ex- 
plored (Johnstone 1970, 1990; Mifsud 1998). Reflexive rhetoric, where rhetori- 
cal transactions particularly of a deliberative kind are internalized within one 
individual, finds an individual torn asunder by the recognition of a particular 
problem and the alternative ways of solving the problem. If rhetoric only wedges, 
the sundered self will collapse into schizophrenia. The end of reflexive delibera- 
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tive rhetoric is to bridge the poles of the divided mind, re-creating a unity of 
mind manifest in a personal decision. 
While we could continue delineating examples of "rhetoric as a bridge," this 
is not the task of this note. Rather we hope these examples help to show the need 
for supplementing the slogan 'rhetoric as a wedge.' A properly rhetorical trans- 
action must both wedge and bridge. What begins as an opening of conscious- 
ness must end in judgment in order for a rhetorical transaction to reach its telos. 
While one might say that the coming of awareness of a particular problem (as in 
the case of most deliberative and forensic rhetoric) or a particular ideal of virtue 
(as in epideictic rhetoric) is a rhetorical moment, it is not the telos but the arche' 
of the rhetorical transaction. For the transaction to be completed it must move 
from awareness to judgment. The metaphor of the rhetorical wedge governs the 
former event while the rhetorical bridge governs the latter. If rhetoric wedges 
without bridging, no judgment can be realized and the rhetorical transaction is 
incomplete. And if rhetoric bridges without wedging it becomes bacchanalian in 
nature. Rhetoric presupposes both the wedge and the bridge-the two cannot be 
separated rightly. 
The Pennsylvania State University 
The University of Richmond 
Notes 
'In his first advancement of the idea 'rhetoric as a wedge', Johnstone also made 
use of the word 'bridge.' Our present use of 'bridge' is not precisely the use to which the 
bridge metaphor was put in the relevant passage of The Problem of the Self. But it is too 
much to ask that metaphors be precise. That is the office of technical terms, the relevant 
ones of which are now about to be introduced. 
2For a noteworthy predecessor to the subject of this note see, Kenneth Burke, A 
Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 38-39. 
'Amplification is best understood as a koinon, something that is common to all 
species of rhetoric. It is a technique of persuasion like example and enthymeme. All three 
techniques are koina, but each has its place where it is most at home: amplification in 
epideictic speeches, example in deliberative speeches, and enthymemes in judicial 
speeches. See Aristotle's qualification of amplification as koinon at 1403a. For further 
explanation, see Kennedy (1991), n. 181, 267. 
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